RiskFund.swapPoolsAsset does not allow user to supply deadline, which may cause swap revert

mediumCode4rena

Lines of code

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-venus/blob/main/contracts/RiskFund/RiskFund.sol#L174

Vulnerability details

Impact

Not allowing users to supply their own deadline could potentially expose them to sandwich attacks

Proof of Concept

RiskFund.sol#L174

solidity📋
function swapPoolsAssets(
    address[] calldata markets,
    uint256[] calldata amountsOutMin,
    address[][] calldata paths
) external override returns (uint256) {
    _checkAccessAllowed("swapPoolsAssets(address[],uint256[],address[][])");
    require(poolRegistry != address(0), "Risk fund: Invalid pool registry.");
    require(markets.length == amountsOutMin.length, "Risk fund: markets and amountsOutMin are unequal lengths");
    require(markets.length == paths.length, "Risk fund: markets and paths are unequal lengths");

    uint256 totalAmount;
    uint256 marketsCount = markets.length;

    _ensureMaxLoops(marketsCount);

    for (uint256 i; i < marketsCount; ++i) {
        VToken vToken = VToken(markets[i]);
        address comptroller = address(vToken.comptroller());

        PoolRegistry.VenusPool memory pool = PoolRegistry(poolRegistry).getPoolByComptroller(comptroller);
        require(pool.comptroller == comptroller, "comptroller doesn't exist pool registry");
        require(Comptroller(comptroller).isMarketListed(vToken), "market is not listed");

        uint256 swappedTokens = _swapAsset(vToken, comptroller, amountsOutMin[i], paths[i]);
        poolReserves[comptroller] = poolReserves[comptroller] + swappedTokens;
        totalAmount = totalAmount + swappedTokens;
    }

    emit SwappedPoolsAssets(markets, amountsOutMin, totalAmount);

    return totalAmount;
}

In RiskFund.swapPoolsAsset, there is a parameter to allow users to supply slippage through amountOutMin but does not allow user to include a deadline check when swapping pool assets into base assets, in the event that pool assets is not equal to convertibleBaseAsset.

solidity📋
uint256 swappedTokens = _swapAsset(vToken, comptroller, amountsOutMin[i], paths[i]);

In RiskFund._swapAsset, there is a call to IPancakeswapV2Router(pancakeSwapRouter).swapExactTokensForTokens() but the deadline parameter is simply passed in as current block.timestamp in which transaction occurs. This effectively means that transaction has no deadline, which means that swap transaction may be included anytime by validators and remain pending in mempool, potentially exposing users to sandwich attacks by attackers or MEV bots.

RiskFund.sol#L265

solidity📋
function _swapAsset(
    VToken vToken,
    address comptroller,
    uint256 amountOutMin,
    address[] calldata path
) internal returns (uint256) 
            ...
            ...
            if (underlyingAsset != convertibleBaseAsset) {
                require(path[0] == underlyingAsset, "RiskFund: swap path must start with the underlying asset");
                require(
                    path[path.length - 1] == convertibleBaseAsset,
                    "RiskFund: finally path must be convertible base asset"
                );
                IERC20Upgradeable(underlyingAsset).safeApprove(pancakeSwapRouter, 0);
                IERC20Upgradeable(underlyingAsset).safeApprove(pancakeSwapRouter, balanceOfUnderlyingAsset);
                uint256[] memory amounts = IPancakeswapV2Router(pancakeSwapRouter).swapExactTokensForTokens(
                    balanceOfUnderlyingAsset,
                    amountOutMin,
                    path,
                    address(this),
                    /// @audit does not allow deadline to be passed in by user
                    block.timestamp
                );
                ...
                ...

Consider the following scenario:

1. Alice wants to swap 30 vBNB token for 1 BNB and later sell the 1 BNB for 300 DAI. She signs the transaction calling RiskFund.swapPoolsAsset() with inputAmount = 30 vBNB and amountOutmin = 0.99 BNB to allow for 1% slippage. <br/>
2. The transaction is submitted to the mempool, however, Alice chose a transaction fee that is too low for validators to be interested in including her transaction in a block. The transaction stays pending in the mempool for extended periods, which could be hours, days, weeks, or even longer. <br/>
3. When the average gas fee dropped far enough for Alice's transaction to become interesting again for miners to include it, her swap will be executed. In the meantime, the price of BNB could have drastically decreased. She will still at least get 0.99 BNB due to amountOutmin, but the DAI value of that output might be significantly lower. She has unknowingly performed a bad trade due to the pending transaction she forgot about.

An even worse way this issue can be maliciously exploited is through MEV:

1. The swap transaction is still pending in the mempool. Average fees are still too high for validators to be interested in it. The price of BNB has gone up significantly since the transaction was signed, meaning Alice would receive a lot more ETH when the swap is executed. But that also means that her minOutput value is outdated and would allow for significant slippage. <br/>
2. A MEV bot detects the pending transaction. Since the outdated minOut now allows for high slippage, the bot sandwiches Alice, resulting in significant profit for the bot and significant loss for Alice.

Tools Used

Manual Analysis

Recommendation

Allow users to supply their own deadline parameter within RiskFund.swapPoolsAsset

Assessed type

Other